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ODE TO SARAJEVO: "WHERE HAVE ALL
THE PEOPLE GONE?"*
TERRI R. DAY**
Dedicated to Judge Edward D. Re, Distinguished Professor of
Law, St. John's University School of Law and Mrs. Peggy Re in
appreciation for their visit to the University of Orlando School of
Law.
INTRODUCTION
I took a journey across the ocean to a city, still beautiful despite
the ravages of war, to a place that I knew to be the subject of world
news and the situs of conflict and human rights violations. As an
academic, I studied international law, pondered the future of a
new world order, and followed the fall of communism and the rise
of growing democracies in Europe and the former Soviet Union.
As a law student, I was privileged to be the research assistant to
Professor Winston Nagan,I my mentor and dear friend, who at the
time was Chairman of Amnesty International U.S.A. One of my
assignments was to help him prepare to give testimony before
Congress in the hearings preceding the U.S. ratification of the
Convention on Torture.2
* Inspired by the Pete Seeger song "Where Have All the Flowers Gone" sung by Peter,
Paul and Mary.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Orlando School of Law; LL.M., Yale 1995;
J.D., University of Florida 1991; M.S.S.A., Case Western Reserve University 1976; B.A.,
University of Wisconsin, Madison 1974.
Credit and heartfelt thanks go to Leticia Diaz, Ph.D., Esq., who did the background re-
search for this article, and to Clifford Day, my husband, for his helpful edits. Eternal grati-
tude to Winston Nagan and Donald Day for making this experience possible.
1 Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law and Affiliate Professor of An-
thropology, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. Professor Nagan served as Chair of
the Board, Amnesty International USA, 1989-91.
2 See generally Winston P. Nagan, The Politics of Ratification: The Potential for United
States Adoption and Enforcement of the Convention Against Torture, the Covenants on Civil
and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
311, 311 (1990) (discussing politics of U.S. ratification of international human rights in-
struments while contrasting 37-year history of ratification of The Genocide Convention
with prospect of ratification of future human rights covenants).
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Since I was educated in the area of human rights, I was aware
of international norms and laws as prescribed in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 3 the International Bill of Rights
4
and other legally-binding human rights instruments and treaties.
Despite my education and academic experiences, I was not pre-
pared to come face to face with the people of war: People who wit-
nessed, survived and may have even perpetrated acts of human
rights violations.
Last August, I went to Sarajevo to attend and present a paper
at the Third International Noel Baker-Pauling-Peccei Confer-
ence,5 sponsored by U.N.E.S.C.O. and organized by the Academy
of Sciences & Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation with
other European academies and the World Academy of Art and Sci-
ence. The theme of the conference was democracy, reconstruction
and integrity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Conference was strate-
gically held in Sarajevo, one month prior to the scheduled Septem-
ber 14th free elections, as prescribed by the Dayton/Paris Peace
Agreement on Bosnia.6 In August of 1996, it was not at all clear
whether elections in Bosnia could or would take place one month
later. Many of the election pre-requisites prescribed by the Day-
ton Accord had not been effectuated.7 For example, refugees were
supposed to return to their pre-war homes prior to the elections.'
With an estimated 4 million refugees displaced in camps through-
out Europe and a tenuous cease-fire, it was evident that refugees
could not return home to participate in local elections.
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
4 See Louis HENKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS (1991).
5 The Conference was held on August 20-22, 1996, in Sarajevo, Bosnia & Herzegovina.
6 The Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement, initialed Nov. 21, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/790 - S1
1995/999 (1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 89, 89 (1996). The Dayton and Paris agreements are
substantively the same, the latter (Paris) corrected mistakes in the Dayton Agreement.
7 See generally Paul C. Szasz, Current Development: The Protection of Human Rights
Through the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia, 90 A.J.I.L. 301, 301-02 (1996) (pro-
viding comprehensive overview of Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement, its history and provision
for return of displaced refugees).
8 See id. at 312 (noting that despite condition that refugees be allowed to return, most
remain displaced); see also Valerie Bunce, Peacekeeping in Operation: A Conflict Study of
Bosnia: The Elusive Peace in the Former Yugoslavia, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 709, 709 (1995)
(sadly noting that terrible cost of war was Yugoslavia's 4 million displaced refugees); see
also George Kennedy, Why Push for Elections in Bosnia?, N.Y. TiMEs ABsTRAcTs, Mar. 8,




On the other hand, if elections were postponed, most feared that
violence would be renewed and the hope of peace promised by the
Dayton Agreement would vanish.9 The Conference concluded with
the drafting and adoption of a Declaration1 ° supporting the peace
process, the upcoming elections, and imploring the international
community to extend the commitment of IFOR, the international
peacekeeping forces.
My trip to Sarajevo and the Conference were professionally
gratifying and personally heartfelt. Every time I begin to talk or
write about my Sarajevo experience, I struggle. I am haunted by
the voices of the people I met. I did not understand the language,
but in their voices I heard the pain, the fear, the sadness, the be-
trayal, and the gratitude that we had finally come. Our own
muted voices asked, "How could this happen, how could we stand
by?" I was reminded of the statement written by Nobel prize win-
ner Elie Weisel in describing the pain he witnessed in the eyes of
Soviet Refusniks: "[How can I explain to you] what I myself can-
not even begin to understand.]" 1
Nevertheless, I feel obligated to tell the story of what I saw,
heard, and learned. This is the least that I can do.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Geographically, the former Yugoslavia 2 (SFRY) bordered the
Adriatic Sea, lying east of Italy, south of Austria and north of
Greece. 13 Yugoslavia achieved charter member status in the
United Nations" in 1945.1" In 1946, it was reconstituted as the
9 See Simon Chesterman, Never Again, and Again: Law, Order and the Gender War
Crimes in Bosnia and Beyond, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 299, 320 (1997) (noting that with speedy
elections, U.N. hoped to promote appearance of order).
10 The Sarajevo Declaration was adopted by the participants of the Third International
Noel Baker-Pauling-Peccei Conference on Aug. 22, 1996 in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. (A first draft of the Declaration is on file with the ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL
COMMENTARY).
11 ELIE WEISEL, A BEGGAR IN JERUSALEM 27 (1971) (asking "[do you understand what I
myself cannot even begin to understand?").
12 See BRUCE MCFARLANE, YUGOSLAVIA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 4 (1988). "Yu-
goslav" literally translated means "south slav," a seemingly appropriate name for the
ethnicity of the people comprising the state. Id.
13 See HENRY KISSENGER, DIPLOMACY 328-29 (1994) (providing detailed map of Europe
depicting Yugoslavia under Soviet sphere of influence after World War H).
14 See U.N. CHARTER art. 23. The United Nations is an international organization of
states that fifty states formed to create and supervise some order in the world, to "develop
friendly relations among nations" and "to maintain international peace and security." Id.
art. 1(1), 1(2).
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Federal People's Republic and was comprised of six constituent re-
publics: Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 16 In 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina became an
independent state. 7
It is important to understand the history of the combatants
fighting in Bosnia in 1992.18 Some fourteen centuries earlier, the
ancestors of these same Slavs had migrated to this region from
what we now identify as Poland and the Ukraine. 9 Two of these
migrating tribes were known as the Serbs and the Croats.20 Dur-
ing the Middle Ages, both the Serbs and Croats established king-
doms in the region and these kingdoms were supported by both
the Byzantine (Eastern Orthodox) and Holy Roman (Roman Cath-
olic) Empires.2 ' Consequently, the names Serbs and Croats reflect
15 See JOHN R. LAMPE, YUGOSLAVIA As HISTORY 266 (1996). The author discusses Yugo-
slavia's charter member status. Id. The history of the Balkans is well-documented. This
author recommends the following books as providing both an historical context and a con-
temporary perspective on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE:
THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA (1996); NORMAN CIGAR, GENO-
CIDE IN BOSNIA: THE POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING (1995); TOM GJELTEN, SARAJEVO DAILY:
A CITY AND ITS NEWSPAPER UNDER SIEGE (1995).
16 See MIHALO CRNOBRNJA, THE YUGOSLAV DRAMA 22 (1994) (discussing formation of six
republics of Yugoslavia).
17 See William A. Schroeder, Nationalism, Boundaries, and the Bosnian War: Another
Perspective, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 153, 154 (1994). "In early 1992, the leaders of the three ethnic
communities in Bosnia agreed to a European sponsored plan that would have partitioned
Bosnia into Serb, Croat, and Muslim regions." Id. The U.S. did not support this plan, and
the agreement later collapsed. Id. Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded from Yugoslavia in April
1992. Id. The U.S., the European community and the international community recognized
Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent nation state. Id.; see also Szasz, supra note 7, at
315. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH Republic) was the official name of the
independent Bosnian state. Id. In March 1994, the U.S. sponsored negotiations among the
Bosnian Muslims (Bosniacs), the Bosnian Croats and the Republic of Croatia, which re-
sulted in the creation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH Federation). Id.
The Federation was carved out of the areas of the BH Republic with a majority of Bosniac
and Croat population. Id. Republika Srpska is the Serb entity of the BH Republic. Id.
18 See KISSENGER, supra note 13, at 195 (discussing several historical conflicts occurring
in Bosnia-Herzegovina); see also SABINE PETRA RAMET, BALKAN BABEL: POLITICS, CULTURE
AND RELIGION IN YUGOSLAVIA 34-40 (1992) (wryly noting that multi-ethnic state fell apart
as soon as it was constituted, lurching from crisis to crisis, abandoning one unstable social
formula after another).
19 See GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 24-25 (detailing history of Bosnian).
20 See ROBERT J. DONIA & JOHN V.A. FINE, JR., BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 71 (1994) (not-
ing both Serbs and Croats migrated to northern portion of Yugoslavia); GJELTEN, supra
note 15, at 25 (providing account of Serbian and Croatian migration to Balkan areas).
21 See DONA & FINE, supra note 20, at 7 (discussing ninth century push by Rome into
Croatia, while Byzantine Empire took control of Serbia); see also JOHN V.A. FINE, THE MUS-
LIMS OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 4 (Mark Pinson ed., 1996) (stating that in ninth century,
Roman Christians took control of Croatia, while Byzantine Empire controlled Serbia);
LAMPE, supra note 15, at 3-7 (discussing Byzantine and Roman Catholic control in Serbia
and Croatia, respectively).
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both religious affiliation and political allegiance: The Serbian-By-
zantine tradition and the Croatian-Roman tradition.2 2
By the late fourteenth century, Turkish armies occupied and
ruled Balkan soil and would continue to for the next four centu-
ries.23 The old Slavic states were merged into a single administra-
tive zone. These Ottoman Turks ruled with remarkable tolerance
as reflected by the rarity of forced conversions. Consequently,
most of the conquered Slavs maintained their Christian affilia-
tion.24 The one important exception, however, were the people liv-
ing in Bosnia, most of whom having accepted Turkish rule, con-
verted to Islam.25 So were born Bosnian Muslims: A Slavic-
speaking, Islamic-believing population with wholly European
roots.
The succession of occupiers in this region continued during the
late Nineteenth Century. Ottoman rulers surrendered to Austro-
Hungarian forces in 1878.26 By the end of World War I, both the
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires had collapsed and in
1918, Yugoslavia, an independent south Slav state, was born.
Almost from the beginning, Serb-Croat rivalries undermined
the new Yugoslavian Federation.2 Despite compromises between
Serbian and Croatian leaders, the dreams of Serb and Croat na-
tionalists for separate states persisted. Bosnian Muslims were ex-
pected by both Serb and Croat nationalists to declare themselves
22 See DONIA & FINE, supra note 20, at 73 (pointing out that Croats are of Catholic tradi-
tion; Serbs are of Orthodox tradition); see also LAMPE, supra note 15, at 14-18 (discussing
Croatian conversion to Christianity and Serbia's allegiance to Byzantine Empire).
23 See McFuuAE, supra note 12, at 3 (stating that Turks naturally left stamp on Bal-
kan areas after 400 years of control); see also GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 29-31 (discussing
Ottoman Empire's 400 year rule over Balkan areas); LAMPE, supra note 15, at 18 (same).
24 See Ivo BANAC, THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA: ORIGINS, HISTORY, POLITICS
64-65 (1984) (noting Turkish tolerance of subjects retaining their Christianity); see also
CIGAR, supra note 15, at 15 (1995) (discussing millet system, which allowed Balkan areas to
retain their religions under Ottoman rule).
25 See GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 29 (stating that most of Bosnia's Slav population con-
verted to Islam under Ottoman rule); see also FINE, supra note 21, at 11 (noting significant
number of Bosnians became Muslims under Turkish rule); LAMPE, supra note 15, at 18
(asserting that large number of Bosnians converted to Islam under Turkish rule).
26 See DONIA & FINE, supra note 21, at 90-92. 1875 marked the end of Ottoman rule over
the Bosnians. Id.; ALEx N. DRAGNICH, SERBS AND CROATS: THE STRUGGLE IN YUGOSLAVIA 7-9
(1992). In 1878, the Haspburg Empire (Austria-Hungary Empire) replaced the Ottoman
Empire for control over the Bosnians. Id.
27 See DRAGNICH, supra note 26, at 20 (contending that prerequisite to Yugoslavian inde-
pendence was collapse of Ottoman and Austria-Hungary Empires after World War I); see
also CIGAR, supra note 15, at 17 (same).
28 See GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 35 (contending that infighting between Serbs and
Croats undermined new Federation); see also DONIA & FINE, supra note 20, at 121 (discuss-
ing clashes between Serbs and Croats due to conflicting expectations and perceptions).
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as either Serb or Croat. Hence, there remained no national cate-
gory or separate recognition for "Muslims."29
By 1939, an agreement called the "Understanding" was reached
after negotiations between the Yugoslavian Prime Minister and
the Croat opposition leader. It stipulated that Bosnia would be
split, with Croat-dominated areas going to Croatia and the rest to
Serbia.3 ° One month later, World War II began with the German
invasion of Poland, and in April 1941, Croatia was declared a
Nazi-Allied independent state.1 With the onset of World War II,
the earlier "Understanding" would never be instituted. The Croa-
tian state, supported by Italian and German Nazi forces, was
under the leadership of the fascist Croat Ustashe (Insurgent)
movement. The entire Serbian population of Croatia, including
Bosnia-Herzegovina, was attacked. 2
Bosnian and Croatian Serbs immediately began organizing to
defend themselves. For example, a new Chetnik 33 (guerrilla)
movement was organized from the army of the exiled Yugoslav
government.3 4
An anti-Ustashe, anti-Nazi Partisan movement grew under the
leadership of a Croatian-born Communist named Marshal Tito. 35
Tito and his fellow Partisans declared the formation of a Yugoslav
federation in 1943, which consisted of six republics, including Bos-
nia-Herzegovina.3 6 Despite vigorous objections by both Serb and
Croat leaders, Tito envisioned Bosnia to be mixed in its national
29 See GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 37 (discussing Bosnian Muslims who fled to avoid pres-
sure of deciding whether they were Croats or Serbs).
30 Id. at 37. The agreement also treated Bosnian Muslims as being non-existent. Id. The
understanding, which was called "Spoazrum," divided Yugoslavia and gave more authority
to an enlarged Croatia. Id. For a further description of the partitioning of Yugoslavia, see
FRED SINGLETON, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE (1985).
31 See CIGAR, supra note 15, at 18. In World War II, Nazi Germany destroyed Yugosla-
via. Id. Yugoslavia surrendered and subsequently became a member of the Axis powers. Id.
32 See DONIA & FINE, supra note 20, at 143 (stating that Ustashe committed many atroci-
ties including killing Jews, Serbs, Gypsies).
33 See id. at 143. The term "chetniks" refers to guerrilla fighters, originally Serbian na-
tionalists, who fought the Turks. Id.; GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 35. "Chetniks" were Ser-
bian guerrillas who fought the Turks.
34 See CRNOBRNJA, supra note 16, at 66. A small group of nationalist guerrillas, led by
Colonel Draza Mihailovic, formed the nucleus of resistance against Italian and German
forces. Id.
35 See id. at 68 (examining Tito's formation of six republics of Yugoslavia); see also David
Lenefsky, Three Strikes and You're in-in an International Criminal Court, N.Y.L.J., Aug.
11, 1994, at 2 (noting communist leader Tito's distrust of nationalism).
36 See CRNOBRNJA, supra note 16, at 66-68 (examining Marshall Tito's reign).
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design. 7 In Tito's words "neither Serb nor Croat nor Muslim, but
Serb and Croat and Muslim."3"
After Tito's death in 1980, the Yugoslav federation weakened.3 9
Serb national leaders had accepted an internal border arrange-
ment in Yugoslavia that left almost two million Serbs outside Ser-
bia due to Serb domination of the Communist Party, the federal
army and security forces, and the organs of the central
government.4 °
Social and economic conditions worsened in Yugoslavia.4 ' With
the weakening of the central government, Tito's declaration of Yu-
goslavian brotherhood was denounced by nationalist leaders as "a
big lie."42 By 1990, Tito's portraits had vanished from all public
buildings in Serbia and Croatia.
Between Tito's death and the deteriorating structure of the Yu-
goslavian federation, Bosnia's separate existence as a viable en-
tity was in jeopardy. Patriotic Bosnians left Tito's pictures on
Bosnian office walls, recognizing Tito as a man who had protected
their interests. Meanwhile, Serb and Croat nationalist fervor
increased.
By 1990, no single ethnic group was dominant in Bosnia. Bos-
nia's population was 44 to 49 percent Muslim, 31 to 35 percent
Serbian, and about 17 percent Croatian. 43 Interestingly, a 1990
survey revealed that the Bosnian Muslims were more in favor of a
Yugoslavia Republic than any other ethnic group in the country.
37 See Lori Lyman Bruun, Beyond the 1948 Convention: Emerging Principles of Genocide
in Customary International War, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 193, 198 (1993) (noting Tito
managed to suppress ethnic dissent).
38 GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 39 (discussing Tito's goal of unity and equality among
different religious factions in Yugoslavian republic); LIPE, supra note 15, at 232 (reiterat-
ing Tito's credo of "brotherhood and unity" to dispel ethnic, as well as religious, differences
among Yugoslavians).
39 See Erik Drewniak, Comment, The Bosphorus Case: The Balancing of Property Rights
in the European Community and the Public Interest in Ending the War in Bosnia, 20 FoRD-
HAM INL L.J. 1007, 1046 (1997) (agreeing that Tito's death in 1980 left "power vacuum in
Yugoslavia" that allowed national conflicts to surface); see also PAUL MoJzEs, YuGosLAVIAN
INFERNO 76, 77 (1994) (discussing revival of ethnic strife after Tito's death).
40 See GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 40 (asserting border agreement weakened after Tito's
death).
41 See MOJZES, supra note 39, at 76-77 (describing disintegration of socialist system fol-
lowing Tito's death).
42 See GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 41 (detailing deterioration of political leadership after
Tito's death).
43 See Schroeder, supra note 17, at 154 (discussing current ethnic makeup of Bosnia).
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If nothing else, Tito's Yugoslavia had left them alone, which was
as much as they ever wanted.4
4
Understanding the history of Yugoslavia enables us to dispel
both oversimplification and myth. The war in Bosnia has been ex-
plained as being "domestic, inter-ethnic, and inevitable."45 While
the history reveals age-old tensions between Serbs and Croats, it
is legally incorrect to describe the war in Bosnia as a civil war
because Bosnia was an internationally recognized independent
state when the Serbs and Croats invaded. 46 Despite the centuries-
old nationalist rivalry between Croats and Serbs, Bosnia Muslims
first considered themselves Yugoslavians, then Bosnians, who
merely practiced a different religion from their Serbian and Croa-
tian neighbors.47
How we define a problem will influence how it is solved. Thus,
by defining the war in Bosnia as "domestic, inter-ethnic, and inev-
itable," both international institutions and western governments
were able to avoid responsibility for the genocide that occurred.48
The Serbian Democratic Party, headed by Radovan Karadzic,
one of the leading war criminals still at large, opposed indepen-
dence for Bosnia.49 Bosnian Serb leaders demanded the establish-
ment of a separate "Serb Republic" on Bosnian territory, and the
partitioning of Sarajevo into ethnic zones.
On April 6, 1992, the date associated with the beginning of a
two-year siege of Sarajevo, 20,000 Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and
Croats gathered in front of the Parliament Building to show their
44 See GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 41.
45 See Bunce, supra note 8, at 709.
46 See FiNE, supra note 21, at 3 (stating that both Slavs and Croats invaded Bosnia,
which was already independent).
47 See DONIA & FINE, supra note 21, at 9 (asserting that Croats, Slavs, Bosnians are all
Yugoslavians who speak same language, yet practice different religions); see, e.g., Richard
F. Iglar, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determi-
nation: Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 B.C. INTrL & Comp. L. REV. 214, 230-35
(1992) (discussing broad commonalties and specific differences of Muslims, Slavs, Serbs,
Croats and Slovens).
48 Bunce, supra note 8, at 709. See generally Winston P. Nagan, Genocide Retrospect-
Prospect (unpublished paper delivered to the ABA YLD Standing Committee on World Or-
der Under Law in Chicago, Illinois on August 5, 1995). This paper discusses the labeling of
ethnic conflict and how such labeling hides responsibility for decision-making in ethnic vio-
lence. Id. at 43. "[Glenocide [does] not simply happen. There does exist a chain of responsi-
bility . . . the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was part of a plan, borne of political conflict, to
exterminate whole groups of human beings." Id.
49 See GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 11 (quoting Karadzic as saying "there is no Bosnian
nation"); see also Krajisnik Growing Impatient with Serb Standoff, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Sept. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13401003 (noting Karadzic is hero of Serb
people, who believe he is not criminal, but has merely defended his people).
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support for an independent united Bosnia. Bosnians advocated a
"citizens' state" based on civil rights and constituted for individu-
als of all ethnic and religious backgrounds.5" Snipers from the
Serbian Democratic Party stationed in the Holiday Inn across
from the Parliament Building killed four demonstrators and
wounded several others.
Over the next few years, "the rebel Serb forces through shelling
and gunfire killed more than 9,000 Sarajevans, 1,500 children
among them. United Nations brought more than 100,000 tons of
food and other humanitarian aid to the encircled city, but the av-
erage Sarajevan still lost about twenty-five pounds."5' By the time
the shelling finally ended in the spring of 1994, 70 percent of the
buildings in Sarajevo had been severely damaged or destroyed.
Sarajevo's population of 300,000 prior to the war had dwindled to
only 150,000.52
II. MY VISIT TO SARAJEVO
I arrived in Sarajevo on Tuesday, August 20, 1996. Since there
were no commercial flights into Sarajevo, the Conference at-
tendees gathered in Zagreb, Croatia and traveled by bus to Sara-
jevo. The trip from Zagreb to Sarajevo is about 300 miles. We
were told that the bus ride would be about six and a half hours.
Fourteen hours after leaving Zagreb, however, we finally arrived
in Sarajevo. We ended up taking a circuitous route from Zagreb to
Sarajevo to avoid Serbian-held territory.
The bus ride was one that I will never forget. I remember see-
ing miles and miles of devastation. There was nothing left of the
villages. Only the shells of homes remained: No roofs, no win-
dows and no doors. There were no people anywhere; no signs of
life. The roads were unmarked. The bridges had been knocked
out and temporary ones were rebuilt. There were no lights and no
signs of civilization. We could only ask ourselves in hushed, som-
ber tones: Where have all the people gone? What became of the
50 See DONIA & FiNE, supra note 20, at 1 (detailing events that led to two year war in
Bosnia); GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 2 (discussing early history of two year siege of
Sarajevo).
51 See GJELTEN, supra note 15.
52 Seid Hukovic, Remarks Made in Key-Note Address to Participants of the Third Inter-
national Noel Baker-Pauling-Peccei Conference, Sarajevo (August 21, 1996).
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women, the children and the families that once populated the
area?53
In the darkness, we saw a line of fire stretch across the aban-
doned fields. IFOR troops had deliberately set the fields ablaze in
an attempt to activate the hundreds of thousands of unmarked
mines planted by the Serbs. Because the mines were placed below
the surface, the controlled fires only detonated about 10 percent of
the mines that had turned the beautiful countryside into killing
fields.
On the long bus ride, I read Beverly Allen's book, Rape Warfare:
The Hidden Genocide In Bosnia-Herzegovina And Croatia. Bev-
erly was one of the Conference's participants. She had docu-
mented the existence of a military policy of genocidal rape.54 Rape
for the purpose of genocide took three main forms:
(1) Chetniks (guerrilla fighters or irregular Serb forces) or
other Serb forces enter a Bosnian-Herzegovinian or Croatian
village, take several women of varying ages from their homes,
rape them in public view, and depart. The news of this atro-
cious event spreads rapidly throughout the village. Several
days later, regular Bosnian Serb soldiers or Serb soldiers
from the Yugoslav Army arrive and offer the now-terrified
residents safe passage away from the village on the condition
they never return. Most accept, leaving the village aban-
doned to the Serbs and thus furthering the genocidal plan of
"ethnic cleansing"
(2) Bosnian-Herzegovinian and Croatian persons being held
in Serb concentration camps are chosen at random to be
raped, often as part of torture preceding death;
(3) Serb, Bosnian Serb, and Croatian Serb soldiers, Bosnian
Serb militias, and Chetniks arrest Bosnian-Herzegovinian
and Croatian women, imprison them in a rape/death camp,
and rape them systematically for extended periods of time.
Such rapes are either part of torture preceding death or part
of torture leading to forced pregnancy. Pregnant victims are
raped consistently until such time as their pregnancies have
progressed beyond the possibility of a safe abortion and are
then released. In the first case, the death of the victim con-
53 See, e.g., Anna-Patricia Kahn, Wo Sind Die Busnischen Kinder?, Focus, May 16, 1994,
at 108 ("Where are the Bosnian children?").
54 ALLEN, supra note 15, at 62-63. See also Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms, Rape,
War and Military Culture, 45 DumK L.J. 651, 664 (1996) (examining relationship surround-
ing sexual assault, combat, and military organizations).
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tributes to the genocidal goal; in the second, the birth of a
child does, for the perpetrator - or the policy according to
which he is acting - considers this child to be only Serb and to
have none of the identity of the mother.55
Thirty such death/rape camps were in existence. All forms of
genocidal rape constitute the crime of genocide as described in Ar-
ticle II of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 56 As of Friday, Novem-
ber 29, 1996, only four of the 74 indicted war criminal suspects
have been prosecuted by The Bosnian War Crime Tribunal in the
Hague.5 7
Upon our arrival in Sarajevo, we checked into the infamous Hol-
iday Inn, situated across from the Parliament Building and the
site of the first killings of the two-and-a-half-year siege of Sara-
jevo. It was dark and we were tired. The extent of the devastation
did not become apparent until morning light exposed the
destruction.
Sarajevo was once a beautiful European city that sat in a valley
surrounded by majestic mountains. The city was the host of the
1984 winter Olympics. 58 The world was enchanted by the beauty
of Sarajevo and the city's hospitality, friendliness, sophistication
and apparent unity. In 1984, Sarajevo was a city that embodied
Tito's declaration of Yugoslavian brotherhood.
The remnants of a beautiful city remained. Tragically, however,
the tall, modern buildings that once charmed the world during the
1984 Winter Olympics were mere facades. 59 Every building had
been damaged by Serbian sniper fire and mortar shells. Electric-
55 See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 62-63.
56 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 77 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the United States, Feb. 23, 1989).
57 See Tyler Marshall, A Session Starts Tuesday; War Crimes Trial to Reveal Horrors of
Bosnian Clash; Accused Serb Solider Will be Focus of Tribunal's First Proceeding, MILWAU-
KEE J. & SENTINEL, May 5, 1996, at 24 (discussing commencement of trial of Dusan Tadic,
indicted war criminal); War Crimes Court to Hear Witnesses Against Kradzic; Mladic,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3857729 (reporting that in-
ternational war tribunal began hearing testimony in prosecution against Kradzic and
Mladic); Tracy Wilkinson, Soldier Sentenced for Bosnia War Crime, THE MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 30, 1996, at Al (reporting that Bosnian Croat solider Drazen Erdemovic was sen-
tenced to 10 years for his part in massacre of 1200 Bosnian Serbs).
58 See Sports Briefs, AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN, Jan. 13, 1997, at D2, available in
1997 WL 2809279 (noting recent reopening of Sarajevo's famous Olympic ski areas, closed
since 1992).
59 But see Steve Collins, USA TODAY, May 7, 1996, at B1 (reporting on Olympic commit-
tee's pledge of 15 million dollars to rebuild stadium damaged by war).
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ity and water had been completely cut off during the two-and-a-
half-year siege of Sarajevo.6" Although electrical and water serv-
ices have since been restored, such amenities are still available
only a few hours a day.
There was no running water at the Academy of Sciences and
Arts, the site of the Conference. We were invited to a lovely meal
at the home of the President of the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, one of the two entities dividing the BH Republic.61 We
were treated with all the fanfare and formality of foreign dignita-
ries. Imagine my shock upon discovering that even the Presi-
dent's home did not have running water. The toilet did not flush
and water would not flow through the faucet.
Despite an arms embargo,62 Sarajevo fought alone for two and a
half years. I heard the desperation, isolation, and the feeling of
betrayal by the international community in their voices. There
were several panel discussions on various topics during the two
and a half day conference. Microphones were provided so that
members of the audience could participate along with the panel
members. Although there were interpreters, Bosnians in the au-
dience often spoke so frantically and with so much emotion that
the interpreters could not continue to translate. There was so
much pain in the voices of the speakers!
I befriended a young Bosnian Muslim man who transported me
and other participants back and forth from the Academy to the
hotel. He detailed some of the horrors of living surrounded by en-
emy fire. The Holiday Inn sat on a main street. This street was
known as "sniper alley" because the civilians were daily targets of
the Serb snipers positioned on the hillside.63 My friend pointed
out the place where ten, twenty or sixty people were killed on any
60 See Aida Cerkez, Seige in Sarajevo is Officially Over. City Dwellers Say They're Survi-
vors of Hell, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETE, Mar. 1, 1996, at 1 (reporting that survivors are still
at mercy of Serbs for electric, gas and water).
61 On August 22, 1996, the Conference participants dined at the home of President
Kresimir Zubak.
62 See S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. 5/RES/
713(1991), reprinted in 31 L.L.M. 1427, 1431-32 (1992). The U.N. Security Council adopted
resolution 713, which authorized the arms embargo, because the situation was a threat to
international peace and security. Id.
63 See Philip Smucker, Albright Uses Carrot and Stick, WASH. TIMES, June 2, 1997, at
Al, available in 1997 WL 3673611 (describing U.S. Secretary of State Madeline K Al-
bright's stroll down "once perilous alley"); see also Pope Braves Bosnia's Death Alley,
GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Apr. 13, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 4579763 (relating
Pontiffs journey in Popemobile past "notorious sniper alley" during peace-keeping visit).
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given day. 64 I wondered how he was able to go outside during the
two and a half year siege since most people remained inside for
days upon days to avoid becoming human targets. He answered
that one would run across "sniper alley" with his or her eyes
closed, hoping not to be hit by gunfire. "In war," he lamented.
"everyone does things they regret." I knew he was remembering
the atrocities he had witnessed and perhaps even participated in.
He was a soldier who had defended Sarajevo during the siege.
It is hard to understand how neighbor turned against neighbor
in Sarajevo. Sarajevo's history of interfaith harmony was unpar-
alleled in all of Europe. Mosques, churches, and synagogues were
built within yards of one another in the city center and spiritual
leaders routinely acknowledged one another's holy days. Most Sa-
rajevo Christians grew up familiar with Islam; Sarajevo Muslims
often joined their friends at worship services on Christmas Eve or
Easter. I heard a story about an old Muslim man who regularly
went to a Catholic church to pray because his legs were weak and
he liked sitting in a pew. "It is the house of God," he explained.
"God is all-knowing."
Most Sarajevans did not consider themselves Serb, Croat or
Muslim. The intermarriage rate was 35 percent, the highest in all
of Bosnia.6" Consequently, many of the children had parents of
mixed ethnic backgrounds.
I can not answer the question of how neighbor turned against
neighbor. But to me the parallels between Nazi Germany in the
1930s and Bosnia in the 1990s are frighteningly similar. For ex-
ample, notice how the minutes of an official meeting of Serb Army
officers, held just outside Belgrade in late 1991, sound strikingly
similar to Nazi dictates:
Our analysis of the behavior the Muslim Communities dem-
onstrates the morale, will, and bellicose nature of their groups
can be undermined only if we aim our action at the point
where the religious and social structure is most fragile. We
refer to the women, especially adolescents, and to the chil-
dren. Decisive intervention on these social figures would
64 See, e.g., Sniper Alley Horror Captured on Film, THE INDEPENDENT-LONDON, Mar. 6,
1996, available in 1996 WL 4061216 (reporting on sniper alley documentary that showed
woman and dog felled by sniper fire).
65 See GJELTEN, supra note 15, at 10 (stating that Sarajevans do not identify themselves
as one group or another since prevalence of intermarriage renders such issues moot).
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spread confusion among the communities, thus causing first
of all fear and then panic, leading to a probable (Muslim) re-
treat from the territories involved in war activity.
In this case, we must add a wide propaganda campaign to our
well-organized, incisive actions so that panic will increase.
We have determined that the coordination between decisive
interventions and a well-planned information campaign can
provoke the spontaneous flight of many communities.6 6
CONCLUSION
As a Jew, I identified with the Bosnian Muslims. This was not a
military war, it was a war of genocide. Bosnian Muslims, who
were descended from the same Serb and Croat ancestors as their
Christian brothers and sisters, were targeted for annihilation for
no reason other than their religious practices.
How could this happen? How could we stand by? Yes, Weisel
said, "How can I explain to you what I myself cannot even begin to
understand."67 But it is our burden and obligation to determine
how this could have happened. As American citizens, lawyers,
and human beings, our moral compass commands us, even at this
late date, to educate ourselves and try to salvage and rebuild the
lives of people who are not so different than you and me.
Torture, murder, rape camps, mass graves, widows, orphans,
and ghost-towns. Where have all the people gone? And all of this
less than fifty years after we said "NEVER AGAIN."
66 ALLEN, supra note 15, at 57.
67 WIESEL, supra note 11.
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